Summary
IP-based access control can be bypassed: get_condition_values trusts client-supplied X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip without verifying a trusted proxy, so any reachable client can spoof aws:SourceIp and satisfy IP-allowlist policies.
Details
- Vulnerable code:
rustfs/src/auth.rs:289-304 sets remote_addr from X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip, then inserts SourceIp via
get_source_ip_raw, with no trust boundary or proxy validation:
let remote_addr = header.get("x-forwarded-for").and_then(...).or_else(|| header.get("x-real-ip")...).unwrap_or("127.0.0.1");
args.insert("SourceIp", vec![get_source_ip_raw(header, remote_addr)]);
- This value feeds IAM/bucket policy evaluation in
rustfs/src/storage/access.rs (authorization path), so any request that forges the header can meet aws:SourceIp conditions.
- No authentication is required beyond the request itself; the header is taken at face value even on direct connections.
PoC
rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc.tar.gz
Steps (already included in rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc/):
- Start RustFS with two local volumes, e.g.:
mkdir -p /tmp/rustfs-data1 /tmp/rustfs-data2
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=devadmin RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=devadmin \
cargo run --bin rustfs -- --address 0.0.0.0:9000 \
/tmp/rustfs-data1 /tmp/rustfs-data2
- From
rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc/, run:
ENDPOINT=http://127.0.0.1:9000 make run
The script:
- Creates bucket `rustfs-trusted-ip-poc`.
- Applies a bucket policy allowing `s3:ListBucket` only from `10.0.0.5/32` (`Principal: {"AWS":["*"]},` Resource array).
- Sends three unauthenticated `ListBucket` calls:
- Baseline (no spoof) → HTTP 403.
- Spoofed `X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.5` → HTTP 200 (policy bypass).
- Spoofed `X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4` → HTTP 403.
- Responses saved to `poc-baseline.xml`, `poc-spoofed.xml`, `poc-deny.xml`.
Impact
- Vulnerability type: Authorization bypass of IP-allowlist (
aws:SourceIp) via header spoofing.
- Who is impacted: Any deployment relying on
aws:SourceIp in IAM/bucket policies for S3 operations. Attackers with network reach to RustFS can forge forwarded-IP headers to gain list/read/write where IP restrictions were meant to block them.
Credits
Identified by SecMate (https://secmate.dev) automated analysis and validated during manual triage.
References
Summary
IP-based access control can be bypassed: get_condition_values trusts client-supplied X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip without verifying a trusted proxy, so any reachable client can spoof aws:SourceIp and satisfy IP-allowlist policies.
Details
rustfs/src/auth.rs:289-304setsremote_addrfromX-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip, then insertsSourceIpviaget_source_ip_raw, with no trust boundary or proxy validation:let remote_addr = header.get("x-forwarded-for").and_then(...).or_else(|| header.get("x-real-ip")...).unwrap_or("127.0.0.1");args.insert("SourceIp", vec![get_source_ip_raw(header, remote_addr)]);rustfs/src/storage/access.rs(authorization path), so any request that forges the header can meetaws:SourceIpconditions.PoC
rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc.tar.gz
Steps (already included in
rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc/):rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc/, run:Impact
aws:SourceIp) via header spoofing.aws:SourceIpin IAM/bucket policies for S3 operations. Attackers with network reach to RustFS can forge forwarded-IP headers to gain list/read/write where IP restrictions were meant to block them.Credits
Identified by SecMate (https://secmate.dev) automated analysis and validated during manual triage.
References