Fix product.html column sizing with autoWidth: false. Same as here https://github.com/DefectDojo/django-DefectDojo/pull/13835#13868
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…x/2.53.1-2.54.0-dev Release: Merge back 2.53.1 into bugfix from: master-into-bugfix/2.53.1-2.54.0-dev
* add asset/org info * remove ref to P/PT nestability * change screenshot * add contact email * Update docs/content/en/working_with_findings/organizing_engagements_tests/pro_assets_organizations.md Co-authored-by: Cody Maffucci <46459665+Maffooch@users.noreply.github.com> * Update docs/content/en/working_with_findings/organizing_engagements_tests/pro_assets_organizations.md Co-authored-by: Cody Maffucci <46459665+Maffooch@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Osinski <paul.m.osinski@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Cody Maffucci <46459665+Maffooch@users.noreply.github.com>
* update changelog * update pro_features.md * Update docs/content/en/changelog/changelog.md Co-authored-by: Cody Maffucci <46459665+Maffooch@users.noreply.github.com> * Update docs/content/en/changelog/changelog.md Co-authored-by: Cody Maffucci <46459665+Maffooch@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Osinski <paul.m.osinski@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Cody Maffucci <46459665+Maffooch@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Paul Osinski <paul.m.osinski@gmail.com>
🔴 Risk threshold exceeded.This pull request makes sensitive edits to multiple core files (dojo/importers/base_importer.py, dojo/filters.py, dojo/finding/views.py, and dojo/utils.py) and introduces an information disclosure issue where get_visible_scan_types() exposes all active scan types to any authenticated user with product/engagement access; it also uses unvalidated workflow input release_number as the ref in .github/workflows/release-x-manual-docker-containers.yml, allowing a repo write attacker to run arbitrary code with workflow secrets.
🔴 Configured Codepaths Edit in
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| Vulnerability | Configured Codepaths Edit |
|---|---|
| Description | Sensitive edits detected for this file. Sensitive file paths and allowed authors can be configured in .dryrunsecurity.yaml. |
🔴 Configured Codepaths Edit in dojo/filters.py
| Vulnerability | Configured Codepaths Edit |
|---|---|
| Description | Sensitive edits detected for this file. Sensitive file paths and allowed authors can be configured in .dryrunsecurity.yaml. |
🔴 Configured Codepaths Edit in dojo/finding/views.py
| Vulnerability | Configured Codepaths Edit |
|---|---|
| Description | Sensitive edits detected for this file. Sensitive file paths and allowed authors can be configured in .dryrunsecurity.yaml. |
🔴 Configured Codepaths Edit in dojo/utils.py
| Vulnerability | Configured Codepaths Edit |
|---|---|
| Description | Sensitive edits detected for this file. Sensitive file paths and allowed authors can be configured in .dryrunsecurity.yaml. |
🔴 Configured Codepaths Edit in dojo/utils.py
| Vulnerability | Configured Codepaths Edit |
|---|---|
| Description | Sensitive edits detected for this file. Sensitive file paths and allowed authors can be configured in .dryrunsecurity.yaml. |
Untrusted Input in GitHub Actions Workflow in .github/workflows/release-x-manual-docker-containers.yml
| Vulnerability | Untrusted Input in GitHub Actions Workflow |
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| Description | The GitHub Actions workflow '.github/workflows/release-x-manual-docker-containers.yml' uses the release_number input directly as the ref for the actions/checkout step without any validation. An attacker with write access to the repository can trigger this workflow_dispatch event and provide an arbitrary Git reference (e.g., a malicious branch, tag, or commit hash) to the release_number input. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the workflow runner, which has access to sensitive secrets like DOCKERHUB_TOKEN and DOCKERHUB_USERNAME. |
Information Disclosure of Scan Types in dojo/finding/views.py
| Vulnerability | Information Disclosure of Scan Types |
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| Description | The get_visible_scan_types() function, used in the ListFindings view, retrieves all active Test_Type objects without performing any authorization checks. While the ListFindings view itself has authorization checks (Permissions.Product_View or Permissions.Engagement_View), the get_visible_scan_types() function does not filter the scan types based on the user's permissions. This means any authenticated user with access to a product or engagement can view a list of all active scan types configured in the system, regardless of whether they have specific permissions to create or manage those scan types. This could reveal internal security tooling and capabilities to unauthorized users. |
django-DefectDojo/dojo/finding/views.py
Lines 306 to 309 in 3fbb770
We've notified @mtesauro.
All finding details can be found in the DryRun Security Dashboard.
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Should I rebase against bugfix, or is dev -> bugfix the correct approach? Sorry, it's been a while since I've contributed. |
add autoWidth: false to engagements also
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Update - I found this problem in the engagements_all.html file as well at the bottom under 'Closed Engagements' it has bad formatting. |
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Thanks. Looks like the PR needs a rebase or cherrypick of your sommit onto the bugfix branch. |
Will do - not sure what happened. |
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If it's easier to just cherry pick these commits in a different PR and close this PR, that's fine. Think I have some Git issues going on, if that merge didn't fix it. Been a while since I've used that system - so it may need some cleaning up locally. |
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Found the issue, I'll open a fresh PR and get rid of this noise - apologies. |
Same as this PR, just in the product area instead of findings. The formatting drives me mad lol
#13835
Edit to update -- also found in Engagements All -> Closed (bottom of page) - bad formatting.